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Sierra Club v. San Antonio: In Search of the 
Appropriate Application of the Buiford Abstention* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 1 was decided in the 1943 Supreme Court term. 
The well known "Burfonf' or "administrative" abstention doctrine evolved 
from this important case. 2 A departure from the recently created Pullman 
abstention, Burford was to become another of the difficult to apply absten-
tion doctrines whose appropriate application and scope remain something 
of a mystery. The Supreme Court has had other opportunities to utilize the 
Burford abstention, but has found it appropriate in only one instance eight 
years after the abstention was first articulated in Burford. The lower courts 
have found the Burford abstention more attractive and have had more oc-
casions in which to apply it, but the courts remain in conflict regarding the 
proper application and scope of the Burford abstention. Considering the 
lack of consensus among the courts some scholars question whether it has 
been well enough defined to appropriately be called a "doctrine" at all. 3 
In this climate of controversy every application of the Burford absten-
tion is closely scrutinized and critiqued in an effort to find the appropriate 
scope and definition of the abstention. Such is the backdrop to the Fifth 
Circuit's application of the Burford abstention in Sierra Club v. City of 
San Antonio.4 
This Note will compare and contrast the application and scope of the 
Burford abstention in Sierra Club with the Supreme Court's treatment of 
the doctrine. It will also consider the propriety of the Fifth Circuit's alter-
native application of the Burford abstention and whether there is sufficient 
justification for abstention in the absence of a substitute state forum. This 
Note will then discuss a possible conclusion to what the appropriate scope 
and application of the abstention might be. 
* Copyright © 1998 by David Carter. 
I. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
2. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans et. al., 491 U.S. 
350, 361 (1989). 
3. RICHARD H. FALLON, ET. AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1247 (4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter HART AND WECHSLER]. 
4. Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
It is widely recognized that the jurisdiction which Congress has chosen 
to confer upon the federal courts is not a matter of the courts' discretion, 
but is generally mandatory.5 However, over the years some judicially de-
veloped exceptions to the mandatory jurisdiction requirement have 
evolved. These so-called "abstentions" allow a federal court to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over a suit otherwise properly within the jurisdiction 
of the federal court. These abstentions are considered to be the exception 
rather than the rule because they pose one important problem: litigants are 
deprived of an intended federal forum in which to litigate their claims. 
Because the abstentions are not water-tight compartments and are 
closely related, a basic understanding of the Pullman abstention is helpful 
in a discussion of the Buiford abstention. The Pullman abstention origi-
nated in 1941 in Railroad Commission v. Pullman6 two years before 
Burford was decided. Scholars summarize the Pullman abstention as a 
doctrine that "involve[s] challenges to state action in which resolution of 
an unsettled state law issue could eliminate the need to decide a difficult 
federal question. "7 The Pullman abstention is primarily concerned with 
avoidance of constitutional questions if the case can be resolved by resolu-
tion of a state law question. It is only secondarily interested in avoiding 
friction between federal and state law.8 The Buiford abstention on the 
other hand is fundamentally concerned with preventing interference with 
state law mechanisms, especially in areas of complex state interests. 
Buiford broadened the justifications for abstention, allowing federal courts 
to abstain in certain cases in order to prevent interference with state law.9 
This broadening of the abstention doctrine is, in part, what made Burford 
controversial 
Burford involved a suit brought by the Sun Oil Company in federal 
district court seeking to enjoin an order by the Texas Railroad Commission 
which granted Burford a permit to drill four oil wells on a relatively small 
plot of ground in East Texas. 10 They order was attacked on both federal 
due process grounds as well as on Texas statutory grounds. 11 
Jurisdiction was achieved under the parties' diversity of citizenship 
and under federal question jurisdiction. 12 The Court cited precedent for 
5. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). 
6. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
7. HART AND WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1247. 
8. JAMES C. REHNQUIST, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention 
Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1072 (1994). 
9. /d. at 1077. 
10. Burford, 319 U.S. at 317. 
II. /d.at317. 
12. Id. at 316-17. 
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federal court discretion (whether jurisdiction was invoked under diversity 
of citizenship or under federal question) to "refuse to enforce or protect 
legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public inter-
est."13 The Court went on to say that when it is appropriate to preserve 
public interest, federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction 
over some cases in order to promote the proper independence of state gov-
ernments in carrying out their policies. 14 
The Court focused on the complexity of oil and gas regulation, the 
Texas state interests in the conservation of gas and oil, and the impact on 
the entire industry and state economy. 15 The Court recognized that Texas 
had given the Texas Railroad Commission, which had broad discretion in 
administering the law, the task of regulating the oil industry as well as bal-
ancing the other relevant interests.16 The Court expressed concern that the 
exercise of federal equity jurisdiction would disrupt "the well organized 
system of regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide[d],"17 
which would also require state policy-makers to forge policy "in the light 
of the remotest inference of federal court opinions."18 
Writing for the Court, Justice Black thought it significant that the 
Texas state courts were "working partners" with the Railroad Commission 
in the area of creating a regulatory system for the oil industry. 19 The Court 
also identified what was to become a very important aspect of the Buiford 
abstention in subsequent cases: state court de novo review of the Railroad 
Commission's orders.20 
In the only other instance in where the Supreme Court used the 
Buiford abstention, the Court concentrated on the fact that the appellants 
had bypassed state court review altogether even though the state legislature 
had provided for state court review as a matter of right. 21 Because the op-
portunity for state court review was readily available the Court held that 
abstention was proper. The Court did not think that it was of great moment 
that the state court review was not de novo.22 
The most recent and possibly the most significant Supreme Court 
treatment of the Buiford abstention came in 1989 when the Court took the 
opportunity to summarize the Buiford abstention doctrine-providing 
what is possibly the clearest statement of the doctrine to date. Writing for 
13. !d. at 318 (quoting United States v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933)). 
14. !d. (quoting Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935)). 
15. !d. at 320. 
16. !d. at 320-21. 
17. !d. at 327. 
18. !d. at 329. 
19. !d. at 326. 
20. !d. 
21. Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951). 
22. !d. at 348. 
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the Court in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of 
New Orleans, Justice Scalia defined the abstention in this way: 
Where timely and adequate state court review is available, a 
federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with 
the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) 
when there are "difficult question of state law bearing on pol-
icy problems of substantial public import whose importance 
transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) where the 
"exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in sim-
ilar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a co-
herent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public con-
cern."23 
ill. FACTS OF SIERRA CLUB V. SAN ANTONIO 
The Sierra Club, an environmental protection group, brought an action 
against the City of San Antonio and various other municipalities and gov-
ernmental and private entities in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Texas. The claim alleged that the defendants' usage of 
water from the Edwards Aquifer was killing the fountain darter, an endan-
gered species, in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act. The dis-
trict court granted a preliminary injunction regulating the withdrawal of 
water from the aquifer. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunc-
tion to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which subsequently found that 
the district court's grant of preliminary injunction was an abuse of discre-
tion because the plaintiffs failed to show the requisite substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits. They failed to meet this requirement be-
cause abstention "appear[ed] so manifestly warranted under Buiford."24 
IV. REASONING 
The Fifth Circuit found Sierra Club to be, in many ways, similar to 
Burford.25 It discussed the similarities between the comprehensive regula-
tory schemes of oil and water in the state of Texas. The court concluded 
that the regulation of the state's water supply was just as important, if not 
more important than the regulation of the state's oil supply. 26 The court 
stated that safeguarding the water supply was especially important during 
times of drought, such as the one in which Texas then found itself. The 
23. 491 U.S. at 361 (1989) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976}). 
24. Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 793. 
25. /d. at 793. 
26. /d. at 794. 
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court also explained that curtailing the water supply would have a substan-
tial effect upon the communities and other entities involved. The court 
cited the testimony of a consulting engineer from the City of Leon Valley 
who testified that the restrictions which would result from the federal court 
injunction would cause damage to 50% of the foundations in the city, with 
damages to each foundation ranging from $2,000 to $20,000.27 
The court also explained how both the aquifer and the endangered spe-
cies were completely intrastate, "which makes management of the aquifer 
a matter of peculiar importance to the state."28 The court thought that these 
considerations prompted abstention because under Burford, these issues 
bore on policy problems of substantial public import that transcended the 
results of the case at bar. 
A primary problem the court faced in applying the Burford abstention 
was that the suit arose under the Endangered Species Act, a federally cre-
ated cause of action. The fact that only a federal question is involved gen-
erally urges the exercise of the federal court's jurisdiction. The court ad-
dressed this issue by explaining that application of the "Burford abstention 
does not so much turn on whether the plaintiff's cause of action is alleged 
under federal or state law, as it does on whether the plaintiff's claim may 
be 'in any way entangled in a skein of state law that must be untangled 
before the federal case can proceed.' "29 The court also explained that al-
though the case is based on federal law, it is not distinguish from Burford, 
which also involved a federal constitutional claim. If abstention is war-
ranted when there is an alleged constitutional claim, "then surely it is also 
warranted where the plaintiff claims a federal statutory claim."30 
The district court, in granting the preliminary injunction, reasoned that 
because the Edwards Aquifer Authority had not had time to develop a plan 
for managing the aquifer, abstention was not merited.31 The circuit court 
did not share the district court's perspective and stated that they did not 
"believe that the Burford abstention is applicable only where the state reg-
ulatory scheme is fully in place."32 The court further commented that in 
their view Burford itself did not turn on whether the regulatory scheme 
was old or new, but only on whether or not it was a comprehensive scheme 
that governed a matter of important state interest and where uniform appli-
cation of state rules was vital.33 
27. /d. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. at 795 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712, 1726 (1996)). 
30. /d. at 795-96. 
31. /d. at 796. 
32. ld. 
33. /d. 
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The Sierra Club presented the biggest hurdle that the circuit court had 
to overcome when it contended that the Burford abstention was inappro-
priate because there was no opportunity for state court review for plaintiffs 
under the Edwards Aquifer Act.34 While the court agreed that the Sierra 
Club probably did not have a right of action in state court under state law it 
still found abstention to be appropriate because it found "no authority that 
the Burford abstention cannot apply unless the plaintiff himself has a pri-
vate, judicial cause of action under the state regulatory scheme."35 The 
court also said that "the Supreme Court had recently stated that there is no 
'formulaic test for determining when dismissal under Burford is appropri-
ate.' "36 
V. ANALYSIS 
Sierra Club did not completely imitate either Burford or Alabama 
Public Service Comm 'n, the two instances in which the Supreme Court 
found the Burford abstention to apply. Both of those cases involve chal-
lenges to the orders of a state administrative agency, whereas Sierra Club 
involves a suit brought under federal law not against administrative agen-
cies, but against private parties. Still the exercise of federal jurisdiction in 
such a case has the propensity to interfere with the proceedings or orders 
of the administrative agency and would naturally tum to a discussion of 
the Burford doctrine. 
The decision in Burford gave a less than ordered and concise formula 
to apply when lower courts considered abstention, causing confusion 
among the applications of the Burford abstention in various federal 
34. /d. 
35. /d. at 797. 
36. /d. (quoting New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)). 
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courts. 37 In subsequent cases the Supreme Court condensed the doctrine, 
producing a much shorter and clearer rule. 
To present an ordered and concise analysis of Sierra Club it is useful 
to separate and categorize the most recent and authoritative "restatement" 
of the Buiford abstention found in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. The 
distillation of the Buiford doctrine given by Justice Scalia can be broken 
down into four factors that must be taken into consideration when a federal 
court contemplates abstaining under Buiford. The first, and arguably the 
most important, is whether or not timely and adequate state court review is 
available.38 The second is whether the federal court is sitting in equity.39 
37. Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law From Burford 
to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of Judicial Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred 
Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 877-78 (1993): 
The Supreme Court's Burford opinion provides no formula for applying this 
variety of abstention. Any guidance must be extracted for the facts, both physical 
and institutional, which were emphasized by the Court in reaching its decision. 
The Court justified abstention on grounds of equitable discretion, stressing the 
following factors: 
(a) Congress left the regulation of oil and gas to the states; 
(b) the state regulation was important because of the significance of 
conservation of oil and gas generally, but more particularly, in light of the vital 
importance of those mineral to the Texas economy; 
(c) each oil and gas field had to be regulated as a unit because of great 
factual complexities; 
(d) because the standards applied in a given case involving oil leaseholds 
necessarily affected the 'entire state conservation system,' suits such as Burford 
were seen as public in nature, not merely as suits between private parties; 
(e) because of the public ramifications surrounding private activities within 
the oil industry, the Texas legislature delegated to the Texas Railroad 
Commission the task of adjusting the complex relationships among those with 
interests in the oilfields; 
(f) the Commission was given 'broad discretion in administering the law'; 
(g) judicial review of decisions of the Railroad Commission was confined 
to a single expert court, under a statutory directive to acquire a specialized 
knowledge of oil and gas regulation; 
(h) by statutory directive, the function of the specialized court was not 
simply to engage in ordinary judicial review, but also to act as a 'working 
partner' with the Railroad Commission, having some arguably 'legislative 
powers' in 'shaping' regulatory policy; 
(I) there was a history of mistaken federal court predictions of state 
regulatory law regarding oil allocation so disruptive that at one point the 
governor thought it necessary to impose martial law. 
The opinion did not indicate which of the bewilderingly large number of 
possible combinations of these factors would be sufficient to warrant abstention. 
The particularism and lack of formulaic explanation, typical of an opinion based 
upon equitable discretion, has led to Burford's ambiguity and to its great 
malleability in the hands of the federal courts, from the lowest to the highest 
level. 
38. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. at 361 (1989). 
39. /d. 
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The third is whether there is a state administrative proceeding or order.40 
The fourth contains two prongs: (1) whether there are "difficult questions 
of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose 
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) whether the 
exercise of federal review would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a 
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.41 
A. Timely and Adequate State Court Review 
Satisfaction of the other Burford factors does not appear to be enough 
to warrant abstention if there is no timely and adequate state court review. 
The Supreme Court has explained that "while Burford is concerned with 
protecting complex state administrative processes from undue federal in-
fluence, it does not require abstention whenever there exists such a pro-
cess, or even in all cases where there is a 'potential conflict' with state reg-
ulatory law or policy."42 Given the Court's explanation it is curious that the 
Fifth Circuit was willing to hold that abstention is proper under the 
Burford doctrine in light of the fact that no adequate and timely state court 
review existed, which is probably the most important factor in the Burford 
analysis. In Sierra Club, it is likely that no state court review could occur 
for these plaintiffs because under the Edwards Aquifer Act, the Sierra 
Club does not have a private right of action.43 Judge Reavely explains his 
position with the words, "we find no authority that Burford abstention can-
not apply unless the plaintiff himself has a private, judicial cause of action 
under the state regulatory scheme, and the Supreme Court has recently 
stated that there is no 'formulaic test for determining when dismissal under 
Burford is appropriate.' "44 
Indeed the Supreme Court has said that there is no formulaic test for 
determining when dismissal is appropriate, but in the same breath the 
Court has said that the federal court should conduct a balancing test "based 
on a careful consideration of the federal interests in retaining jurisdiction 
over the dispute and the competing concern for the 'independence of state 
actton,' that the State's interests are paramount and that a dispute would 
best be adjudicated in a state forum."45 The Court restated this important 
balancing test again in the same paragraph and then concluded the para-
graph by confirming that "[t]his balance only rarely favors abstention, and 
40. Id. 
41. Jd. 
42. ld. at 362 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 
800, 815-16 (1976)). 
43. Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 796. 
44. ld. at 797 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1726 (1996)). 
45. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1726 (1996). 
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the power to dismiss recognized in Burford represents an 'extraordinary 
and narrow exception to the duty of the District Court to adjudicate a con-
troversy properly before it.' "46 
There is little evidence that the court in Sierra Club conducted any 
such balancing test. Indeed, even if a balancing test were carried out, the 
result becomes even more troubling. It is reckless for a federal court to set 
at naught the federally enacted Endangered Species Act in order to avoid 
conflict with a state regulatory scheme. Such an action allows the tail of 
state regulatory schemes to wag the dog of federal law. Furthermore, this 
revision of the Buiford doctrine encourages states to drop state court re-
view altogether from their administrative schemes, thus completely avert-
ing the annoyance of private rights of action against the states' administra-
tive agencies both at the state and federal level. 
The Sierra Club approach also creates the interesting situation where 
abstention becomes the rule instead of the exception. If every federal court 
were to abstain in cases brought under federal law because of the potential 
for conflict with a state administrative scheme, abstention would rapidly 
become the norm, a scenario which has been consistently denounced by 
the Supreme Court.47 
Even more troubling is the apparent disregard for the fact that the fed-
eral forum was the only forum available to the plaintiffs in this case. The 
Buiford balancing test should place greater weight on the fact that the fed-
eral forum is the exclusive forum for this particular suit. Such a careless 
attitude offends a fundamental philosophy of American jurisprudence that 
a forum should be available for every controversy.48 
The dissent points out that the view taken by the Sierra Club court is 
inconsistent with prior precedent within the Fifth Circuit itself. The dissent 
identifies a case in which the Fifth Circuit held that the Buiford abstention 
is inapplicable when a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff's claim.49 Sierra Club is not the first time that the Fifth Circuit 
has decided that state court review is not critical to the Buiford analysis. In 
New Orleans Public Service, Inc., the Fifth Circuit did not think that the 
absence of a state law claim was momentous because the "motivating force 
behind the Burford abstention was a reluctance to intrude into state pro-
ceedings where there exists a complex state regulatory scheme. "50 In re-
versing that decision the Supreme Court responded by explaining that 
while it is important to protect complex state administrative processes from 
46. /d. at 1727. 
47. /d. 
48. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
49. See Evans v. Dale, 896 F.2d 975, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1990). 
50. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans et. al., 798 F.2d. 
858, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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federal court interruption it is not dispositive.51 Given this treatment of 
their previous ruling it is mystifying that the Fifth Circuit decided to apply 
the Buiford abstention in a similar manner. 
B. The Federal Court Sitting in Equity 
The second factor to consider is whether or not the suit is in equity. It 
is significant that the Supreme Court sought to limit the Buiford abstention 
to suits in equity because the abstention doctrines originated from such 
equity suits. By limiting abstention to suits in equity the Court "provides a 
rationale (equitable discretion) for harmonizing abstention with the argu-
ably mandatory nature of the statutory grants of jurisdiction to the federal 
courts. "52 
In Sierra Club the plaintiffs asked the federal court to enjoin the City 
of San Antonio as well as various other defendants from pumping more 
water from the Edwards Aquifer in an alleged violation of the Endangered 
Species Act. In this way the second factor is satisfied and abstention is 
counseled, although it is not given the same attention which the other fac-
tors in the Buiford analysis are given. 
C. The Existence of a State Regulatory Scheme 
When applying the Buiford factors to the facts arising in Sierra Club it 
is clear that most of the factors are satisfied. There are certainly factors that 
would caution a federal court from issuing an injunction in this case. In 
this regard it is understandable that the circuit court would look to the 
Buiford abstention as a means of averting a federal question whose resolu-
tion could have a substantial impact on, and could potentially conflict with 
Texas administrative law.53 It is not questioned that there was in place a 
regulatory scheme created for the purpose of regulating the flow of water 
from the Edwards Aquifer. 54 The fact that the regulatory scheme was only 
recently created may counsel abstention if it is viewed from the perspective 
that the new administrative agency should have an opportunity to "get its 
feet wet" before a federal court preempts that scheme. 
However, the regulatory scheme's recent creation can be viewed from 
another perspective which strengthens the argument against abstention. If 
the federal district court were to exercise its jurisdiction in a case where 
the administrative agency was relatively new and very little regulation had 
occurred it would not be as disruptive of the agency's efforts to establish a 
51. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. at 362. 
52. Young, supra note 37, at 910. 
53. Sierra Club, 112 F.3d at 796. 
54. /d. 
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policy. Instead the agency would be able to create policy in light of the 
federal court's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act. 
In the end the court in Sierra Club did not think that the case should 
turn on whether the regulatory scheme was old or new, but on whether or 
not it was a "comprehensive scheme governing a matter of vital state inter-
est, and one where uniform application of the rules was important."55 
D. Difficult Questions of State Law of Substantial Public Import 
The regulation of the water drawn from the Edwards Aquifer is un-
doubtedly of substantial public import. The Edwards Aquifer is the exclu-
sive water supply for the City of San Antonio, a city of over one million 
people, as well as for many of its smaller neighbors. 56 It is also quite possi-
ble that the result of this case would have far-reaching effects that would 
transcend its result. There is the possibility that an injunction would pre-
vent any pumping of water from the Edwards Aquifer entirely. Further-
more, if the federal court were to have issued an injunction against the de-
fendants the Edwards Aquifer Authority would have less autonomy and 
less control over the Edwards Aquifer. Indeed an injunction by a federal 
court in this case may well have left the Edwards Aquifer Authority with 
nothing to regulate if all pumping of the aquifer were enjoined. Equally 
important, the exercise of federal review in this case certainly had the pro-
pensity to disrupt the Edwards Aquifer Authority's efforts to establish a 
coherent policy with regard to the pumping of the aquifer. 
In light of these considerations it may seem proper to finesse the 
question of timely and adequate state court review and order abstention, as 
the Sierra Club court did. Certainly these latter Buiford considerations are 
weighty and counsel abstention in this case, but there is no evidence that 
the Supreme Court ever intended for these considerations to be paramount 
especially in a case in which the impact is largely speculative. After all, the 
Court has said that "[ w ]hile Burford is concerned with protecting complex 
state administrative processes from undue federal interference, it does not 
require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all 
cases where there is a 'potential for conflict' with state regulatory law or 
policy. "57 
Sierra Club seems to present the exact scenario that the Supreme 
Court envisioned when it warned against using the Buiford abstention. 
While it is likely that an injunction would interfere with the state regula-
tory scheme, there is no guarantee that an injunction would be issued. Fur-
ther, there is no guarantee that an injunction would have the feared far 
55. /d. at 796. 
56. /d. at 791. 
57. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 491 U.S. at 362. 
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reaching effects. Essentially, the problem that the circuit court cannot 
avoid is the one discussed above, that this is a case between private parties 
controlled exclusively by federal law which would affect the Edwards 
Aquifer Authority only indirectly. Ordering abstention in this case robs the 
Sierra Club of both a federal forum in which to litigate their claim and lit-
erally any forum in which it might bring its claim. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The appropriate scope of the Burford abstention continues to be am-
biguous, creating opportunity for apparent misapplications of the absten-
tion such as in Sierra Club. This is in part due to the Supreme Court's ap-
parent vacillation in the area. 58 Another source of misunderstanding is the 
fact that the concise test laid down by the Court in New Orleans Public 
Service, Inc. includes a balancing test which leaves open the door for vary-
ing applications of the Burford doctrine as it is applied by different federal 
courts.59 Balancing tests have been historically problematic because they 
require value judgments on the part of the court applying the test. Clearly, 
values may vary greatly among federal judges. As long as the Burford doc-
trine is subject to the balancing test, a spectrum of outcomes will result. 
The area confronted by the Burford abstention does not lend itself to a 
bright-line test that would eliminate the need for such a balancing test. As 
a result, the balancing tests will continue as will the varied results. 
If the Sierra Club court's view of the Burford abstention were the pre-
vailing view, abstention would quickly become the rule instead of the ex-
ception. In a great many instances, a decision by a federal court may affect 
the actions and policy of a state administrative agency. If abstention is 
proper in such circumstances, abstention in federal courts will become the 
norm contradicting everything said by the Supreme Court in Burford re-
garding the abstention doctrines. The Court has envisioned an application 
of the Burford abstention in cases in which the state courts are working 
partners with the administrative agencies in formulating administrative 
policy,60 or in cases in which state court review is available to the plain-
tiffs.61 The Burford abstention was created to allow federal courts to avoid 
conflict with state administrative law when possible. But even this admira-
ble goal becomes controversial in light of the basic principle of American 
jurisprudence that federal courts have no more discretion to decline to ex-
ercise their Congressionally established jurisdiction than they do to usurp 
58. Quackenbush, 116 S.Ct. at 1726. 
59. /d. at 1727. 
60. Burford, 319 U.S. at 325-26. 
61. Alabama Public Service Comm'n., 341 U.S. 341. 
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jurisdiction where none has been granted.62 To avoid a potential conflict 
with state law, at the expense of providing a forum in which a plaintiff 
may litigate its claim, Sierra Club clearly extended the Burford doctrine 
beyond that which was originally envisioned in Burford. 
David Carter 
62. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821). 
